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Overview
Housing is an essential human need, one that not only impacts spiritual and material well-being but also health (Cattaneo et al. 2009 , Thomson et al. 2001 ).
People spend a considerable share of their income for housing, and an integral part of decent housing are sufficiently warm rooms. Consequently, expenses for space heating comprise a substantial share of the energy budget of people living in moderate or cold climates.
In the face of rising energy prices in recent years, the notion of fuel povertythe struggle of low-income households to obtain affordable warmth -has become popular in political discussions. Such households typically live in rented accommodations and have little incentive to invest in the thermal efficiency of property they do not own. Hence, they have little option but to pay the higher energy cost.
Following Bradshaw and Hutton (1983) , fuel poverty can be mitigated by an increase of income or a reduction of energy expenditures. Policy usually provides some mixture of financial assistance to tackle the challenge of energy poverty.
For instance, France, Italy, Belgium and Spain provide special energy tariffs that reduce the energy price for low-income residents (EPEE 2008a (EPEE , 2008b . Germany provides a housing allowance to households reliant on social assistance payment (SAP), which is designed to permit SAP recipients to choose a dwelling of the lower rental price segment, and additionally covers the entire energy expenses for space heating. The annual public spending amounts to more than e12 billion (ARGE 2008 (ARGE , 2009 ).
The theoretical implications of this program are highly controversial. Rather than giving recipients incentives to save energy and thereby reduce their expenditures, the allowance program sends the opposite price signal as it essentially lowers the price for space heating to nil. Moreover, since only low-cost dwellings are covered by the program, it is very likely that the respective flats in turn exhibit a low energy efficiency. Beneficiaries of the allowance may thus consume considerably more energy for space heating than households outside the program. This gives rise to a counteracting effect: the enlarged energy expenditures for SAP recipients may even outbalance the imposed limitations on their rent spending. Other undesirable implications also arise from this counteracting effect: a higher consumption of space heating fuels like natural gas and fuel oil yields higher carbon-dioxide emissions and contradicts the climate protection strategy of the German government. Further, the possible escalated energy consumption of welfare recipients intensifies Germany's dependency on fossil fuelsironically financed by public spending.
Though the principal mechanics underlying the counteracting effect might raise concerns about the design of the German housing allowance program, it is an open empirical question as to whether the magnitude of this effect is large enough to be of political and practical importance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that aims at assessing this effect. We proceed by reviewing some details of the German housing allowance program in section 2. Section 3 describes the data and methodology and provides subsequently the empirical results. Section 4 finally concludes.
Germany's Housing Allowance Program:

Framework and Implications
People who are either long-term unemployed or are unable to participate on the labor market are entitled to receive a SAP to cover their daily expenses, as long as the respective household's income is below a certain threshold. A housing allowance is also provided following the extensive redesign of the SAP at the beginning of 2005. The allowance is designed to permit eligible households to occupy a dwelling of the lower rental price segment, and covers their rent About 90% of the recipients were tenant households, for whom the program framework defines the maximal admissible dwelling size according to the household's size, and limits the maximal rental price per square meter living space, depending on the price level of the respective municipality. If the actual rent expenditures exceed the permissable amount, the program authority usually provides a grace time of six months in which the recipient is required to move to a cheaper dwelling, and pays thereafter only the permissable amount.
To pursue the implications of the program framework more formally, we delineate household i as living in location k, and compute its per-square meter rent r ik and its energy consumption per m 2 e ik :
where R and E denote rent and energy expenditures, respectively; Q denotes i's living space, and p k refers to the price for energy at location k.
Let w denote an allowance receiving household. While people are generally free to choose any dwelling they can afford, the allowance program requires from their recipients that r wl <r l , withr l being the market average rent in location l. Thus, dwellings priced above the average rent can only be occupied by nonrecipients, and program participants should therefore posses on average a smaller ratio between actual and market rent per square meter:
Unlike rent expenditures, the allowance program also covers the actual energy expenditures for space heating. Nevertheless, no clear-cut ex-ante criterion exists to appraise the appropriate amount of energy costs to be covered, as these costs are triggered e.g. by climatic effects. While it is generally intuitive that low-cost dwellings are not endowed with up-to-date and energy-efficient equipment, the concept of hedonic prices and the implications of what is known as filtering theoretically suggest that the dwelling's rent is linked to its amenities, including its energy efficiency. Hedonic prices refer to the characteristics approach by Lancaster (1966) , where the product price is a composition of the individual prices of the product's attributes. Given that quality and energy efficiency are attributes of a specific dwelling, poor quality and an inferior energy efficiency is thought to be associated with a low rent. Filtering refers to the successive shift of the dwelling's occupation from high-to low-income households during its life cycle: as the building ages and deteriorates, it becomes less expensive and more affordable to households with lower income. Filtering thereby implies that the building's quality -defined for instance as technical obsolescence of the heating equipmentis correlated with the building's age (Lowry 1960, Weicher and Thibodeau 1988) , and entails that low-income households live in dwellings at the lower tail of the quality distribution.
1
Along the lines of hedonic prices and filtering we expect that allowance recipients consume comparably more energy per square meter:
Since local climatic conditions trigger differences in energy consumption, e is normalized by local heating degree days (HDD), a measure for the local heating requirement.
2 While equation (2) denotes that allowance program participants will presumably pay a comparably lower rent per square meter, conditional on the local rental price level, equation (3) implies that they have in turn a higher energy consumption for space heating and thus higher energy cost, conditional on the local energy price level and the local climate conditions. The inverse 1 A strong association between income and the thermal performance was observed by Santamouris et al. (2007), who combined the socioeconomic background of surveyed Greek households with information on the insulation standard of their occupied dwelling.
2 The calculation of HDD is described in the appendix. The data set contains information on the household's rent and space heating expenditures in e, the occupied dwelling space in m 2 , a dummy indicating whether the household has received welfare, and a location identifier at the county level. Using this location information, we supplement the household data with the local heating degree days (HDD), the price in e-Cent/kWh for natural gas from the local utility, and the average rent for average dwellings (in e/m 2 ) within the respective county, and conditional on the sample year. Details on the assembly of these regional data are given in the appendix. 
Model Specification
The econometric analysis also incorporates the local climate conditions and the local prices for rent and energy, and proceeds with the following very general two-equation structure:
to examine the differences in rent and energy expenditures between welfarereceiving households and non-recipients. We refer to (4a) For every household we observe both equations jointly, and we observe most of the households in both sample years. The regression residuals u it and v it might therefore possess household-individual aspects and are likely to be correlated across equations and -given the panel structure of our data set -might also be correlated across the sample years. To address this feature we use a maximum-likelihood version of Zellner's (1962) We pursue two different model specifications for equation (4):
Model 1:
Model 2:
Model 1 is specified in log-log form, meaning that the coefficient for the logarithm of the household's living space Q it , for example, can be interpreted as the percentage change of rent expenditures if the living space increases by 1%. The same elasticity interpretation applies for the parameters of the log of the local natural gas price p, the log of the local average rentr, and the log of the local climate variable HDD. The binary variable W it equals one if the household i receives welfare at time t ∈ {2005, 2006}, and is zero otherwise. The parameters for W it capture any percentage difference in rent and energy expenditures between the two groups of households that cannot be attributed to the other covariates, including quality effects due to substandard dwellings.
Model 2 gathers the differences in rent and energy expenses between welfare recipients and non-recipients via the welfare dummy and an interaction of the welfare dummy with the household's living space. We keep this as the only meaningful interaction, since welfare-specific slope parameters for the local average rent, the local gas price, or the weather appear implausible. Possible nonlinear effects of local climate variation on space heating expenditures are captured by including HDD and squared HDD into the energy expenditure equation of model 2.
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The counteractive incentives in the housing allowance program imply a negative sign for the welfare coefficients in the rent expenditure equations of both models, and a positive signs in the energy expenditure equations, respectively.
Parameter Estimates
The As expected, rent and energy cost are both positively correlated to its respective local price level, stressing the importance of accounting for differences in average rent and the local energy prices in the analysis. Living in a location with an average rent e1 above the "overall mean rent" yields increasing housing expenditures of some e67, a figure corresponding to the average dwelling size given in table 1. In turn, raising the gas price by one cent per kWh would increase the monthly space heating expenditures on average by e4. The elasticity estimates of model 1 show that the short-term response to such a market price increase is inelastic. While the parameters for the welfare dummies exhibit the expected signs in both models, only those in the rent equations are statistically significant.
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But even beyond statistical significance one can generally question whether the counteracting effect is of practical and political importance, since our results indicate that the financial offset is of limited scope. For instance, the estimated coefficients of model 1 suggest that welfare recipients exhibit a 9% lower rent but in turn spend 4% more on energy. The descriptive statistics in table 1 clarify that the level of rent expenditures, to which the 9% difference refer, is well above the level of monthly energy cost. By means of the results of model 2, we can compute for the average allowance recipient from 2006 a rent expenditure difference of e38, while the associated rise in energy expenditures amount to only e2. Thus, even if the observed energy expenditure differences would be statistically significant, the offsetting effect would be of small magnitude.
Finally, neither of the coefficients for the climate variables are statistically significant. However, one should not infer that weather has no impact on the space heating demand. The finding simply suggests that the variation of HDD in Germany (regional and across the years) is not large enough to denote significant differences in space heating demand.
Summary and Conclusion
About 3 million households in Germany receive social assistance from a housing allowance program. The program covers the cost of housing and space heating for welfare recipients, and yielded program expenses of more than e12 billion in 2007. By requiring that the rent of beneficiaries be low, the program design may result in a high energy consumption of recipients, meaning high energy cost for the public. This paper has empirically assessed the scope of this effect. Our results show that recipients have indeed comparably lower rent spending, but we found no convincing evidence for a substantially higher energy consumption.
Notwithstanding our findings, one can question the incentive structure inherent in the allowance program. Currently, the program does not provide any stimulus to the beneficiaries for saving energy but subsidizes their energy consumption.
Although improved energy efficiency of the building stock is a key political goal of the German government, the program yet provides an opposite market signal as it sustains a permanent demand for low-cost/low-quality dwellings. Landlords serving this demand have actually no incentive to retrofit their property. To the contrary, a retrofit will usually raise the dwellings's rent, and the home might become too expensive to be covered by the allowance program.
In summary, although the program design obviously limits public expenditures, the current design perpetuates the emissions of greenhouse gases and thereby contradicts Germany's climate protection efforts.
Appendix: Data Assembly of Regional Data
To compute the household's heating degree days (HDD) we make use of temperature data, metered by a grid of 140 weather stations from Germany's National Meteorological Service.
7 Subsequently, the HDD are calculated as the difference between 20
• C indoor temperature and the daily average outdoor temperature below 20 • C, summed over all days of a year for which the average outdoor temperature is below 12 • C. To obtain overlapping coverage of the weather data with household locations, we use a Geographic Information System (GIS) and spatially interpolate the metered temperature to the household locations.
The majority of dwellings in Germany are heated with natural gas. We thus approximate the local energy price p k with the average end-user price of natural gas, charged by the utilities operating in the respective county and including the standing charge for the gas meter. Because the provided utility data denote prices of August 2008, the data are discounted using an energy price index to obtain prices of 2005 and 2006, respectively. 8 For many of the household locations we lack observed data for the respective average rent. To proceed, we impute this figure via a two-step procedure. In the first step, we regress observed average rent of 325 German cities from 167 counties on a set of county-specific variables. Using the estimation results, predicted values inhabitant. However, a closer inspection of the data from the 325 cities reveal, that 90% of the observations lie below this minimum, suggesting the expected negative correlation between available living space and average rent. Finally, the east dummy does not appear to be significant, an unsurprising finding after having controlled for many county-specific circumstances.
Finally, the average rent of all 440 German counties is imputed using the estimates from table 3 and the county specific elements of the vector z z z.
